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Abstract: The German Accounting Law Modernization Act (BilMoG) represents a 
change in paradigm with regard to the traditionally close relationship between financial 
and tax accounting in Germany. At the same time, requirements on the disclosure of 
deferred taxes were revised considerably. We make use of these new disclosure provi-
sions to disaggregate firms’ deferred tax position and to analyze the components of 
temporary book-tax differences that add to the reporting gap in Germany. To this end, 
we apply a unique dataset of hand-collected information from individual financial 
statements for the fiscal year 2010. We find considerable differences between financial 
and tax accounting and observe that temporary book-tax differences are mainly associ-
ated with mandatory differences in accounting for provisions. The scope and quality of 
tax-related disclosures vary substantially and the overall disclosure quality is low. In 
order to identify the determinants of the heterogeneity of disclosure quality, we con-
struct an index for voluntary and mandatory disclosure of deferred tax information and 
conduct multivariate analyses to explain firms’ disclosure decisions. We show that the 
recognition of deferred tax assets and liabilities on the face of the balance-sheet is sig-
nificantly and positively related with disclosure quality in the notes to the financial 
statements. Further, our results suggest that larger firms are more likely to have high-
quality tax disclosures and that high implementation costs could also explain the ob-
served shortfalls in disclosure quality. Moreover, we find that different reporting incen-
tives might apply if reporting on losses is assessed in isolation. We use these insights to 
derive implications for the discussion about whether and how to reform disclosure re-
quirements under German GAAP. 
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1 Introduction 
Enhanced transparency in firms’ tax reporting has been called for by various parties in 
the last years. Most recently, the discussion on the profit shifting activities of multina-
tional corporations (BEPS) has given rise to the claim that these MNEs should be 
obliged to disclose profits and tax payments on a per-country basis (so called country-
by-country reporting) (Spengel et al. (2014)). Similarly, it has been the objective of the 
German Accounting Law Modernization Act (Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz 
(BilMoG)) enacted in 2010 to enhance the information value and transparency of finan-
cial statements. Moreover, the BilMoG Act constitutes a change in paradigm with re-
gard to the traditionally close relationship between financial and tax accounting. The 
abolishment of the reverse authoritative principle implies a transition from a so-called 
one-book system in Germany towards a more two-book oriented system with two inde-
pendent sets of accounting rules. Interestingly, this development is contrary to the ongo-
ing discussion in the US where arguments for a stronger alignment of the two sets of 
accounts are brought forward (Desai (2003; 2005); Hanlon/Heitzman (2010)). The 
analysis thus provides valuable insights into the general debate to what extent financial 
and tax accounting should be aligned. 
As an additional element of the reform, accounting for deferred taxes and tax disclosure 
requirements under German GAAP were revised considerably. In particular, the intro-
duction of the temporary approach applied in accounting for deferred taxes and the new 
disclosure rules of Sec. 285 No. 29 of the German Commercial Code (HGB) potentially 
provide new insights into the actual relationship between financial and tax accounting 
and therefore more transparency.  
Accordingly, the objectives of this paper are to study firms’ reporting behavior after the 
implementation of the BilMoG-Act and to make use of the additional disclosures on 
deferred taxes in order to identify book-tax differences from publicly available data. In 
this regard, we make two contributions. First, we assess whether the new rules of dis-
closure meet the objective of increased transparency on firms’ tax positions, in particu-
lar whether they provide sufficient information to reliably determine firms’ tax positions 
from financial statements. We use these insights to derive implications for the discus-
sion about whether and how to reform disclosure requirements with regard to deferred 
taxes. Second, in view of the heterogeneity in disclosure behavior, we identify the rele-
vant determinants of firms’ disclosure quality in a multivariate regression analysis. In 
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order to address these research questions, we apply a unique dataset of hand-collected 
information from individual financial statements for the fiscal year 2010.1 This compre-
hensive dataset enables us to disaggregate firms’ deferred tax position and to shed light 
on the components of temporary book-tax differences that add to the reporting gap in 
Germany. 
To address the first research question, we disaggregate deferred taxes into categories in 
order to understand the sources and origins of the reporting gap. This approach is in line 
with recent U.S. research (e.g. Poterba et al. (2011) and Raedy et al. (2011)). To our 
knowledge, we provide the first detailed analysis of book-tax differences and the com-
ponents of deferred taxes in Germany for a significant sample of individual financial 
statements. Previous German literature, in contrast, mainly uses information from con-
solidated financial statements (e.g. Kager et al. (2011)) which comes at the cost that no 
direct link can be established to tax accounting based on the separate entity approach. 
Our analysis reveals considerable differences between financial and tax accounting. 
Moreover, we find that temporary book-tax differences mainly result from mandatory 
differences in accounting for provisions. As several corporations exceed current disclo-
sure requirements and provide additional quantitative information on deferred taxes, we 
are not only able to identify the sources of the German reporting gap, but also the 
amount of temporary book-tax differences and estimate future tax consequences for a 
considerable subsample of 158 corporations.  
Given the substantial heterogeneity in disclosure quality, the second part of the analysis 
addresses the question of why some firms decide to disclose detailed information about 
expected future tax consequences, while others do not even comply with the regulations 
of Sec. 285 No. 29 HGB. In an attempt to provide explanations on the determinants of 
tax disclosure quality, we construct an index for voluntary and mandatory disclosure of 
deferred tax information and conduct multivariate analyses to explain firms’ disclosure 
decisions. Overall, our results suggest that companies which disclose deferred taxes on 
their balance sheets as well as larger ones are more likely to have high-quality tax dis-
closures and that high implementation costs might also explain the observed shortfalls 
in disclosure quality. We also find that different reporting incentives may apply if re-
porting on losses is assessed in isolation. In fact, the existence of deferred taxes without 
1  In this context, we build on earlier work by Zinn (2012), chapter 4.2 and Matenaer (2013), chapter 
4.3. 
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clear and transparent reporting guidelines creates information asymmetry about future 
tax consequences between the users of financial statements and the management and 
provides ample room for earnings management.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the institutional background of the 
BilMoG-Act and the changed provisions with respect to accounting for deferred taxes. 
Section 3 gives an overview of the related international and national literature. Subse-
quently, we present the results of our descriptive and empirical analysis in Section 4. 
First, subchapter 4.1 describes the sample and our hand-collected dataset. Section 4.2 
shows the results of analyzing the notes to the financial statements and provides evi-
dence on the sources and magnitude of the reporting gap. In Section 4.3 we present the 
research design of our empirical analysis as well as the results of our attempt to identify 
determinants of disclosure quality. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2 Institutional background 
The German Accounting Law Modernization Act (BilMoG) entered into force in 2010. 
While its main intention was to increase the information value and transparency of fi-
nancial statements by attaining convergence towards International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), the reform act has not only affected numerous aspects of financial 
reporting, but also changed the traditionally close relationship between financial and tax 
accounting in Germany. One of the main tax amendments brought by the BilMoG-Act 
is seen in the revision of Sec. 5 (1) 1 EStG and thereby the abolishment of the reverse 
authoritative principle (umgekehrte Maßgeblichkeit, Sec. 5 (1) 2 EStG (old version)) 
allowing tax accounting options to be exercised independently from the accounting 
treatment in individual financial statements. The advanced flexibility in both financial 
and tax accounting created by the BilMoG-Act is expected to increase book-tax differ-
ences in Germany (Herzig et al. (2011)), thus broadening the scope of deferred taxes.  
In addition, accounting for deferred taxes under German GAAP was fully revised and 
more or less adopted to the concept of IAS 12 within the framework of the BilMoG Act. 
One of the most substantial changes in this regard is the switch to the internationally 
prevailing temporary differences approach.2 The principal aim of the newly implement-
ed Sec. 274 HGB is to account for temporary differences between financial and tax ac-
2  The temporary differences approach considers temporary differences between the carrying amount of 
assets or liabilities and their tax bases. In other words, the focus of the deferred tax calculation in the 
temporary differences approach is on differences that appear on the balance-sheet.  
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counting which dissolve over time.3 Deferred tax assets may also be recognized with 
regard to tax loss carry-forwards to the extent that the corporation expects sufficient 
taxable profits to utilize the carry forward within the next 5 years. Sec. 266 (2) and (3) 
HGB prescribe that deferred tax assets and liabilities should be presented as separate 
items in the balance sheet. According to Sec. 274 (1) HGB, corporations may choose 
between a balanced or a separate recognition of deferred tax assets and liabilities. Im-
portantly, net deferred tax liabilities represent a future obligation and therefore have to 
be recognized and presented on the balance sheet, whereas the recognition and presenta-
tion of net deferred tax assets is optional.4 Hence, if deferred tax assets exceed deferred 
tax liabilities, corporations may either opt for a gross or a net presentation or they may 
choose not to present a net deferred tax asset at all. In other words, managers have a 
substantial deal of discretion when reporting on deferred taxes. As regards the valuation 
of deferred taxes, Sec. 274 (2) HGB stipulates that temporary book-tax differences and 
loss carry forwards should be measured with reference to the corporation’s individual 
tax rate at the time at which the differences will reverse.  
Sec. 285 Nr. 29 HGB5 specifies further disclosure requirements with regard to the notes 
to the financial statement. Accordingly, all temporary book-tax differences and loss 
carry forwards on which the deferred taxes are based, i.e. the nature and source of de-
ferred tax assets and liabilities, shall be disclosed in the notes. This not only applies to 
recognized deferred taxes, but also to those (net) deferred tax assets which the corpora-
tion has chosen not to present on its balance sheet. Moreover, Sec. 285 Nr. 29 HGB 
requires the disclosure of the tax rate applied to determine deferred taxes. Apart from 
that, there are no further quantitative disclosure requirements, i.e. qualitative disclosures 
are sufficient and no separate disclosure of the amount of any deferred tax asset or lia-
bility or a quantitative reconciliation between the carrying amount in the financial 
statements and the tax base are necessary. Furthermore, Sec. 285 HGB doesn’t contain 
any guidance on the level of detail required so that heterogeneous reporting behavior 
across firms may be expected.  
3  A deferred tax asset is recognized if the corporation will pay less income taxes in the future. A de-
ferred tax liability is recognized if the corporation will pay more taxes in the future due to a transac-
tion that took place during the current period. 
4  Thereby, deferred tax assets on temporary differences may only be recognized in compliance with the 
prudence principle, i.e. corporations shall only recognize deferred tax assets if it is probable that taxa-
ble income will be available to utilize the deductible temporary differences. 
5  According to Sec. 267 HGB, 274 a Nr. 5 and 288 (2) the requirements laid down in Sec. 274 and 285 
only apply to large and medium-sized corporations. 
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Generally, Sec. 275 (2) No. 18 resp. 275 (3) No. 17 HGB prescribes that the total in-
come tax expense shall comprise the current income tax expense as well as the deferred 
tax expense or benefit and be disclosed on the face of the income statement. According 
to Sec. 274 (2) S. 3 HGB, the deferred tax expense or benefit, measured as the current 
year change in deferred tax assets and liabilities, shall be disclosed separately. This can 
be either done in the form of a sub-heading, a column entry or a “of which” note to the 
total income tax expense. 
3 Related literature 
Our paper relates to four different strands of literature. The first strand concerns the 
general discussion on book-tax conformity, i.e. the extent to which financial and tax 
accounting should be aligned.6 In short, while proponents such as Desai (2003, 2005) in 
particular point to a lower incentive for upward earnings management as well as down-
ward tax planning if the two sets of accounts are aligned, opponents (e.g. 
Hanlon/Maydew (2009); Hanlon/Shevlin (2005)) argue that such conformity would de-
crease the informational value and transparency of accounting numbers. We contribute 
to this literature by examining whether the objective of increased transparency due to 
the convergence towards a more two-book oriented reporting system is actually met.  
Secondly, since tax return data is usually not publicly available, there are numerous 
empirical studies, which aim at drawing conclusions on tax positions from information 
in the financial statements. Manzon/Plesko (2002) for instance measure the estimated 
taxable income as reported current tax expense divided by the corporate tax rate. As 
Hanlon (2003) points out, these approximation methods are, however, subject to several 
measurement problems and thus only deliver a rough estimate of the actual tax liability. 
Many academics therefore call for mandatory disclosure of additional tax information to 
refine the common estimation approaches (e.g. Tran (2010); Plesko (2006); 
McGill/Outslay (2004); Hanlon (2003)). Nevertheless, several studies tried to overcome 
the constraints of these standard approaches. On the one hand, there are some investiga-
tions that exceptionally had access to tax return data (e.g. Zinn/Spengel (2012); 
Lisowsky (2009); Plesko (2007); Plesko (2003); Mills et al. (2002)). On the other hand, 
several studies rely on enriched datasets including hand-collected detailed tax infor-
mation from the notes to the financial statements which are usually not available in the 
6  For an extensive overview see Hanlon/Heitzman (2010). 
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standard databases. In this regard, Blaylock et al. (2012, p. 119) point out the potential 
of studies “that examine the details of firms’ tax footnotes […] to make an important 
contribution to our understanding of the link between large BTDs and earnings persis-
tence”. Philips et al. (2004) use hand-collected information from firm’s financial state-
ment disclosures and separate deferred tax assets and liabilities into eight different com-
ponents, e.g. depreciation of tangible assets and tax carryforwards, to detect earnings 
management. Guenther (2011) and Raedy et al. (2011) examine the causes for the link 
between disaggregated book-tax differences as derived from the schedule of deferred 
taxes in the notes to the financial statements and earnings persistence. They find a posi-
tive relation between persistence and temporary book-tax differences. Poterba et al. 
(2011) identify the most important sources of (temporary) book-tax differences by de-
composing deferred tax positions to explore corporations’ support of tax reforms. Final-
ly, Kager et al. (2011) use information on deferred taxes to approximate differences 
between German tax values and IFRS consolidated financial statements. The latter dis-
aggregate deferred tax assets and liabilities for 18 German corporations into balance-
sheet items and conclude that the most important differences between IFRS consolidat-
ed accounts and tax accounts occur for intangible assets and provisions.7 To contribute 
to this strand of literature, we assess whether the new disclosure requirements on de-
ferred taxes provide sufficient information on book-tax differences and enable the relia-
ble determination of firms’ tax positions from financial statements. 
Thirdly, only a small number of papers assesses the reporting behavior of German cor-
porations after the BilMoG-Act. Froschhammer/Haller (2012) for instance examine 362 
financial statements of German corporations with regard to the question whether ac-
counting options are exercised in accordance with IFRS after the BilMoG-Act. They 
find that this is not the case for the majority of options. In their assessment of IFRS con-
solidated financial statements of the years 2009 and 2010, Keitz et al. (2011) conclude 
that the information quality of the notes to the financial statements is very heterogene-
ous. Likewise, Phillips (2011) includes 53 early adopters of the BilMoG-Act in his 
study and finds that for a significant part of the sample, mandatory information in the 
notes is not sufficient or even missing. Hahn et al. (2012) examine 132 consolidated 
financial statements of non-capital market oriented corporations prepared under German 
GAAP with regard to the implementation of the new regulations introduced by the Bil-
7  It should be noted that the study by Kager et al. (2011) also includes data of 18 Austrian corporations.  
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MoG-Act. They conclude that the reporting quality depends in particular on the size of 
the corporation. To our knowledge, there has so far not been a comprehensive study on 
the reporting behavior of German corporations in individual financial statements after 
the revision of reporting on deferred taxes. First, our contribution therefore lies in the 
analysis of the latter. Moreover, we use these findings to derive implications for the 
discussion about whether and how to reform disclosure requirements with regard to de-
ferred taxes, an insight also relevant for other countries and standard setters.   
Finally, the fourth relevant strand of literature refers to the second part of our paper, 
namely the identification of determinants driving disclosure quality. In that regard, Hea-
ly/Palepu (2001) extensively review the empirical disclosure literature. Similarly, Ah-
med/Courtis (1999) provide a comprehensive meta-study on this subject.8 Some papers 
explicitly assessed the relationship between disclosure behavior and measures of corpo-
rate governance (e.g. Ho/Wong (2001) and Eng/Mak (2003)). Most recently, Robin-
son/Schmidt (2013) analyzed firms’ reporting quality with regard to the implementation 
of FIN 48. The major variables identified as determinants for disclosure quality in these 
studies will be discussed and explained in detail in Section 4.3. We contribute to the 
literature on disclosure quality by particularly exploring what factors drive the reporting 
quality of corporations with regard to deferred taxes. 
4 Empirical evidence 
4.1 Sample and data collection 
We construct a hand-collected dataset of individual financial statements which contain 
the key information required in our approach, i.e. component-based information on de-
ferred taxes. The benefit of this unique dataset is that tax related information disclosed 
in the notes to the financial statements can be exploited which is usually not covered in 
commercial datasets. For this purpose, we collect data from individual financial state-
ments and construct our sample with virtually all listed German corporations for the 
fiscal year 2010. Most individual financial statements were taken from the German Fed-
eral Gazette (elektronischer Bundesanzeiger).9 If any financial statements were not 
available, the information was downloaded from the corporations’ websites. In a second 
step, all tax-related data from the balance sheet, the income statement and the notes to 
the financial statement were collected and matched. Overall, for each corporation in our 
8  For a broad overview, please also refer to Chavent et al. (2006) and Hassan/Marston (2010). 
9  The electronic German Federal Gazette is available online, see https://www.bundesanzeiger.de.  
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sample, more than 100 items were taken from the individual financial statements.10 The 
initial sample comprises 940 listed corporations. Of these, 65 firms were dropped be-
cause they are either affected by insolvency proceedings, liquidation or reorganization. 
Also, a total of 34 corporations from the financial industry were excluded due to sys-
tematic differences in their regulatory environment. Additionally, 39 corporations with 
incomplete or deviating financial years and 23 entities of a tax group were excluded. 91 
observations were lost because we were not able to access those firms’ individual finan-
cial statements or other information required when running our analyses. Finally, we 
exclude 223 small and medium-sized corporations, as several details in the notes to the 
financial statements are not required for those firms.11 Hence, the final sample compris-
es 465 corporations.  
4.2 Inferring BTD from the notes to the financial statements 
4.2.1 Sample characteristics 
 
Figure 1: Sample characteristics: Recognition of deferred taxes in balance sheets 
In Figure 1 we characterize the sample with respect to the disclosure of deferred tax 
assets and liabilities in the balance-sheet. We find that deferred tax assets and liabilities 
are rarely disclosed on the face of the balance-sheet in individual financial statements. 
Precisely, 346 (=270+12+64) firms (74.41%) do not recognize deferred tax assets and 
liabilities. Among these firms, 270 corporations make use of the accounting option of 
Sec. 274 HGB and report that they do not recognize net deferred tax assets, while 64 
corporations – even though reviewed by external auditors – do not provide any infor-
mation at all on deferred taxes. By contrast, 12 corporations explicitly state that tempo-
10  To further supplement the hand-collected data, we match each observation with information in the 
DAFNE database provided by Bureau van Dijk, using both the German securities identification code 
(WKN) and the Crefo-ID, and validate the match using firm names and total assets.  
11  For the classification criteria, see Sec. 267 HGB. 
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rary differences between financial and tax accounting do not exist, i.e. they are assumed 
to prepare only one set of accounts for both financial and tax accounting (Einheits-
bilanz). With respect to corporations recognizing deferred taxes on the face of the bal-
ance-sheet, 21 firms separately disclose gross amounts, while 98 corporations either 
report net deferred tax assets (54) or net deferred tax liabilities (44). Although not re-
quired on a mandatory basis, an overall of 68 corporations voluntarily recognize and 
disclose deferred tax assets and the corresponding tax benefit in their individual finan-
cial accounts.  
The complexity and great deal of managers’ discretion in accounting for deferred tax 
assets, in particular resulting from the recognition option, and the fact that deferred tax 
assets and deferred tax liabilities have opposing impact on profits after taxes plausibly 
suggests that it is used for earnings management. This conjecture is in line with empiri-
cal evidence that firms manage tax accounts to achieve financial targets or meet ana-
lysts’ forecasts (e.g. Dhaliwal et al. (2004); Phillips et al. (2004)). In other words, the 
deferred tax account could provide a favorable and almost costless opportunity for earn-
ings management, if managers have an incentive to achieve a particular financial target, 
e.g. avoid declines in profit after taxes, or threshold. In fact, neither dividend distribu-
tions (Ausschüttungssperre, (Sec. 268 (8) HGB))12 nor actual tax payments are affected 
by the recognition of deferred tax assets. Moreover, as disclosure requirements and their 
enforcement are limited under German GAAP, reporting costs are low. Accordingly, 
accounting for deferred taxes provides managers with broad opportunities in their re-
porting decisions, leaving capital market participants and other stakeholders with con-
siderable difficulties in inferring book-tax differences and firms’ future tax positions. 
Moreover, the discretion in accounting for deferred taxes creates information asym-
metry between the users of financial statements and the management and, thus, contra-
dicts the main intention of the BilMoG-Act to increase the information content of finan-
cial statements prepared under German GAAP. To sum up, deferred taxes are a highly 
relevant account to study firms’ reporting behavior. 
  
12  Pursuant to Sec. 268 (8) HGB tax benefits resulting from the recognition of deferred tax assets must 
not be distributed.  
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4.2.2 Estimating current and future tax consequences 
As deferred taxes potentially affect profits after taxes,13 we assess the materiality of 
deferred taxes in relation to profits before taxes. In that respect, in the first row of Ta-
ble 1, we report that deferred tax expenses and benefits may play an important role in 
firms’ profits. For instance, for 10% of the firms in the subsample, deferred tax expens-
es amount to almost 60% of profit before taxes. Relating deferred tax assets and liabili-
ties to current year’s profits before taxes informs about the magnitude of future tax con-
sequences resulting from firms’ temporary book tax differences; an information particu-
larly useful for external users of financial statements demanding information on firms’ 
future economic prospects. As displayed in the second row of Table 1, deferred taxes 
can be material in terms of their potential effects on future profits and cash-flows. The 
mean estimated future tax consequence amounts to 19.17%. In other words, the imme-
diate reversal of all temporary book-tax differences would come, on average, along with 
a tax benefit of approximately one fifth of the current year’s profit before taxes. This is 
substantial.  
Table 1: Estimation of future tax consequences due to deferred taxes  
Estimated future tax consequences Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Percentiles 
50% 75% 90% 
Ratio of deferred taxes (deferred tax 
expense) to profit before taxes 
27.94% 0.7748 5.53% 24.01% 57.99% 
Estimated future tax consequence, 
total [(deferred tax assets-deferred 
tax liabilities) / profit before taxes] 
19.17% 1.2184 0.00% 3.41% 48.51% 
Estimated future tax consequence, 
unused tax loss-carryforward  
63.61% 1.5532 0.00% 52.50% 195.75% 
Note: All differences are winsorized at the first and 99th percentile. Observations: 158 corporations. 
Likewise, the potential income effects of recoverable tax loss-carryforwards are consid-
erably high. For firms reporting deferred tax assets on unused tax loss-carryforwards, 
the average expected tax benefit amounts to 63.61%. For one tenth of the corporations 
in the subsample, future tax benefits resulting from the use of recoverable tax loss-
carryforwards exceed roughly 200% of current year’s profit before taxes. This finding is 
13  A deferred tax benefit increases profits after taxes, the opposite applies for deferred tax expenses. 
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generally in line with evidence on the substantial amount of firm-specific tax loss-
carryforwards in Germany (Dwenger/Walch (2011)). 
4.2.3 Decomposing deferred tax assets and liabilities 
We extend the analysis by having a closer look on what information is disclosed in the 
notes to the financial statements. This allows us to address the question whether this 
information is useful to identify the sources of firms’ book-tax differences. To this end, 
we take advantage of the new rules of disclosure under Sec. 285 No. 29 HGB and dis-
aggregate total deferred taxes into its components. Overall, we form twelve distinct cat-
egories of temporary differences between financial and tax accounting. These categories 
capture differences between the carrying amounts of assets and liabilities and the corre-
sponding tax bases as well as firms’ recoverable loss-carryforwards.  
  
11 
 
Table 2: Components of deferred tax assets and liabilities (qualitative)  
Categories 
# firms 
Total 
Deferred tax 
asset 
Deferred tax 
liability 
Both /  
undefined 
Assets 
Intangible assets  15 8 7 -- 
Capitalized R&D expenses  4 -- 4 -- 
Goodwill 11 8 3 -- 
Tangible assets  105 52 39 14 
Financial assets 46 20 22 4 
Shareholdings 41 16 21 4 
Loans  6 5 1 0 
Inventories  28 25 3 0 
Receivables and other assets  56 24 24 8 
Liabilities  
Tax free reserves (Sec. 6b EStG)  14 -- 14 -- 
Provisions 266 220 21 25 
Pension provisions 164 147 13 4 
Other provisions  203 173 8 22 
Accounts payable  29 13 12 4 
Group category (others)  
Other temporary differences 84 29 38 17 
Losses  
Recoverable tax loss-carryforward  166 166 -- -- 
Note: Observations: 318 corporations. Please also note that for aggregate positions (Financial assets, Provisions) the 
figures do not necessarily add up from the sub-categories, but they account for those companies that provide infor-
mation on both subcategories.  
Table 2 provides an overview of how frequently each of the 13 categories of temporary 
differences is reported in the sample. Most remarkably, only 318 of the 465 corpora-
tions in the sample (68.39%) fulfill their disclosure obligations (by Sec. 285 No. 29 
HGB) and provide information on the sources of book-tax differences. Besides the 64 
corporations providing no information at all about deferred taxes, 83 corporations do 
neither provide qualitative nor quantitative information on temporary differences or on 
tax loss-carryforwards which the (un-)recognized deferred tax assets and liabilities are 
based on.  
For the subsample of 318 disclosing corporations, the most frequently disclosed catego-
ry is provisions. The latter includes pension provisions as well as all other provisions, 
e.g. provisions for contingent losses. Approximately 84% of corporations in the sub-
12 
 
sample (266) report differences between the carrying amount of provisions and their tax 
bases. This is not surprising, since regulations governing accounting for provisions dif-
fer considerably between the commercial and the tax code. Due to the stricter recogni-
tion and measurement criteria for tax accounting purposes, the number of firms report-
ing deferred tax assets (220) on provisions exceeds the number of firms disclosing de-
ferred tax liabilities by far (21).14 The most important source of deferred tax liabilities is 
tangible assets, which can mainly be attributed to the application of tax-favorable de-
preciation schemes. As mentioned above, such accounting options may be exercised 
independently from the treatment under financial accounting since the implementation 
of the BilMoG-Act in 2010. Concerning deferred tax assets on loss-carryforwards, 166 
corporations expect future taxable benefits resulting from unused and recoverable loss-
carryforwards. In this regard, it is also important to note that 100 corporations either 
report that unused tax loss-carryforwards do not exist or that existing tax loss-
carryforwards are not recoverable, i.e. there is a probability that there will be no taxable 
profits available within the next five years against which the carryforward can be set-
off.  
As described in section 2, the new rules of disclosure of Sec. 285 No. 29 HGB do not 
stipulate quantitative disclosures on temporary book-tax differences in the notes to the 
financial statement. However, a subsample of 158 corporations voluntarily provides 
such quantitative information on the different components of deferred tax assets and 
liabilities. For these corporations, temporary book-tax differences can be computed by 
grossing-up of deferred tax assets and liabilities with the firm-specific tax rate identified 
from the notes.15  
Table 3 offers insights into the amount of temporary book-tax differences for the sub-
sample of 158 corporations. Overall, the means of temporary differences vary widely 
across the thirteen categories of deferred tax assets and liabilities. Notably, temporary 
deductible differences exceed temporary taxable differences for all categories, except 
for shareholdings. In line with Table 2, provisions are not only the most mentioned 
source of book-tax differences, but also account for the highest amount of temporary 
differences in our sample. In particular, the carrying amounts of other provisions differ 
14  For 25 corporations reporting on deferred taxes on provisions we cannot identify whether a net de-
ferred tax asset or a net deferred tax liability exists (see Table 2). 
15  The mean tax rate for 331 corporations (134 corporations do not disclose tax rates at which deferred 
taxes are measured, despite being required by accounting standards) is 29.16%. 
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remarkably from the tax bases (EUR 85,281,430 and EUR 1,101,826 respectively). The 
same holds true for tangible assets and inventories.  
Table 3: Components of temporary differences (quantitative) 
Category  # firms 
Temporary  
deductible differences 
# firms 
Temporary  
taxable differences 
Mean  
Standard 
Deviation  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  
Assets 
Intangible assets              
Capitalized R&D expenses  -- -- -- 2 5,200,058 6,934,442 
Goodwill 4 4,588,891 6,152,945 1 3,343,333 -- 
Tangible assets  39 51,936,120 269,183,600 23 36,902,790 85,573,850 
Financial assets             
Shareholdings 11 557,560 572,613 13 25,864,260 70,792,740 
Loans  3 1,885,890 1,759,153 1 96,552 -- 
Inventories  15 66,080,170 235,411,900 3 62,391,724 107,227,859 
Receivables and other assets  20 1,551,537 2,831,574 17 1,317,822 2,594,228 
Liabilities  
Tax free reserves              
(Sec. 6b EStG) -- -- -- 3 1,827,765 245,093 
Provisions             
Pension provisions 62 20,040,470 85,199,680 12 3,404,747 7,568,550 
Other provisions  89 85,281,430 663,236,400 14 1,101,826 2,582,853 
Accounts payable  11 18,241,490 43,639,820 7 905,318 811,267 
Group category (others)  
Other temporary differences 31 9,244,340 17,463,770 28 7,100,666 15,781,870 
Losses  
Unused tax loss-carry forward  73 41,140,810 125,205,900 -- -- -- 
Note: Observations: 158 corporations. 
As regards firms’ deferred tax assets on tax loss-carryforwards, the last row of Table 3 
also shows that 73 corporations provide quantitative information on unused tax loss-
carryforwards, which average EUR 41,140,810. In this regard, it is important to note 
that only recoverable losses, i.e. tax loss-carryforwards for which firms expect that they 
can be utilized within the next five years, can give rise to deferred tax assets. However, 
as several firms exceed reporting requirements it is possible to analyze the recoverabil-
ity and the expected economic consequences of loss-carryforwards in future periods as 
well as firms’ expected economic prospects based on a limited number of firms.  
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Interim Conclusion 
Our descriptive results indicate that Germany is far away from a one-book accounting 
system. Quite the opposite, firm-specific temporary book-tax differences can be large 
and material in terms of their potential effect on future profits and cash-flows. Our find-
ings suggest that accounting for provisions (mostly mandatory book-tax differences) as 
well as unused tax loss-carryforwards are at the heart of book-tax differences in Germa-
ny. The two key lessons learnt from the examination of firms’ notes to the financial 
statements are the following: First, taking into account the considerable impact of de-
ferred taxes on firms’ future economic prospects, the lack of objective and specific ac-
counting regulations for deferred taxes under current German GAAP must be criticized. 
That is, both the discretion in recognizing net deferred tax assets and the unspecific dis-
closure requirements of Sec. 285 No. 29 HGB without mandatory quantifications create 
information asymmetry between the management and the users of financial statements 
and contradict the objective of the BilMoG-Act to increase the information content and 
transparency of financial statements in Germany. 16 Hence, the possibility of inferring 
taxable income from financial statements remains limited. Therefore, we recommend 
abolishing the recognition option for deferred tax assets to reduce managerial discretion. 
Furthermore, disclosure requirements for deferred taxes in the notes should become 
more detailed and precise as well as include mandatory quantifications. These findings 
could also be of relevance for standard setters outside of Germany. Second, firms exhib-
it substantial heterogeneity in their reporting behavior concerning deferred taxes. Con-
sistent with the above criticism, actual tax disclosures are inconsistent in terms of the 
level and quality of information provided across firms. While some corporations report 
comprehensively on the sources and magnitude of book-tax differences, others disclose 
no information at all.  
  
16  Similar, Küting/Seel (2009, p. 925).  
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4.3 Determinants of disclosure quality 
On the basis of this insight, we now address the question why some firms disclose de-
tailed information on deferred taxes and future tax consequences, while others do not 
even comply with the disclosure requirements of Sec. 285 No. 29 HGB. In doing so, our 
research design focuses on the factors that influence the disclosure of information on 
deferred taxes, rather than their existence. In particular, we aim at understanding the 
observed heterogeneity in firms’ reporting behavior and at identifying determinants of 
tax disclosure policy. 
4.3.1 Research Design  
Disclosure index 
The quality of tax-related disclosures is measured by applying a simple disclosure mod-
el that consists of two components.17 The first component measures disclosure compli-
ance, i.e. the compliance with the mandatory disclosure requirements of Sec. 274 HGB, 
Sec. 284 (2) No. 1 HGB and Sec. 285 No. 29 HGB, which consists of five mandatory 
disclosure items (Table 4). The second component measures voluntary disclosures. In 
fact, many firms exceed the disclosure requirements foreseen by German GAAP and 
provide external users of financial statements with clarifying information on deferred 
taxes. The selection of voluntary disclosure items is not only based on the recommenda-
tions of DRS 1818 and previous literature on deferred tax disclosures (e.g. Prysta-
wik/Schauf (2011) and Oser et al. (2011)), but we also consider the disclosures encoun-
tered in the course of the review of individual financial statements as discussed above. 
Overall, seven items of voluntary disclosure were identified. Accordingly, the aggregate 
disclosure score, which is the sum of mandatory and voluntary disclosure items, has a 
maximum value of 12 (Table 4).  
17  For a similar procedure, see Robinson/Schmidt (2013). 
18  Deutscher Rechnungslegungsstandard (German Accounting Standard) 18.  
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Table 4: Scoring model: Mandatory and voluntary disclosures  
Item  #  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
Min Max 
Mandatory disclosure of/that… (Sec. 274 HGB; Sec. 284 (2) No. 1 HGB; Sec. 285 No. 29 HGB) 
(1) deferred taxes on the face of the balance-sheet and 
corresponding explanations in the notes  
or  
the corporation does not recognize net deferred tax 
assets  
465 0.8451 0.3621 0 1 
(2) the tax rates at which deferred taxes have been meas-
ured  
465 0.7134 0.4527 0 1 
(3) temporary differences on which (un-) recognized 
deferred taxes are based on (qualitative) 
465 0.6839 0.4655 0 1 
(4) tax loss-carryforwards have been taken into consider-
ation when reporting on deferred taxes (qualitative) 
465 0.5677 0.4959 0 1 
(5) deferred tax expenses or benefits on the face of the 
income statement 
119 0.4538 0.4999 0 1 
Mandatory disclosure  465 2.933 1.502 0 5 
Voluntary disclosure of…  
(6) aggregate deferred tax assets  
(quantitative)  
369 0.404 0.4913 0 1 
(7) temporary differences on which (un-) recognized 
deferred taxes are based (quantitative) 
465 0.3054 0.4611 0 1 
(8) recoverable loss-carryforwards  
(quantitative) 
465 0.3376 0.4734 0 1 
(9) non-recoverable loss-carryforwards 
(quantitative)  
465 0.1255 0.3317 0 1 
(10) the different types of taxes that the loss-carryforward 
is based on (quantitative) 
115 0.4869 0.5020 0 1 
(11) temporary differences at the level of all entities of the 
tax group are recognized in the controlling entity’s 
financial statement 
111 1 0 1 1 
(12) the sources and magnitude of temporary differences 
that occur at the levels of group entities (quantitative) 
10 1 0 1 1 
Voluntary disclosure  465 1.469 1.641 0 7 
Aggregate disclosure  465 4.402 2.793 0 12 
 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the disclosure scores and the individual score 
items for the entire sample of 465 observations. The means of the respective reporting 
items indicate the degree to which corporations provide disclosures on the single com-
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ponents. For instance, the mean of 0.8451 for mandatory item 1 reflects strong compli-
ance whereas the mean of 0.5677 (item 4) unfolds much weaker willingness to report on 
losses.  
Like most other disclosure studies we apply an item-based approach using a dichoto-
mous procedure (Chavent et al. (2006, p. 184)).19 In order to reduce subjectivity, the 
applied approach is unweighted, i.e. each disclosure item is assumed to be equally im-
portant (Ahmed/Courtis (1999, p. 36)). Put differently, all considered disclosure items 
score one if disclosed and zero if not. Moreover, following Cooke (1989, pp. 182-183), 
we explicitly account for the interrelationships between the different items and pay at-
tention to the non-disclosure of items irrelevant to the firm. Accordingly, the score 
scheme is employed as follows:  
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑓 = �𝑑𝑓,𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
 
with 𝑑𝑓,𝑖 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
1 if item di is disclosed by the firm             
0 if item di is not disclosed by the firm     
  n.a. if item is not relevant to the firm            
 
 
𝑛    = maximum number of items scored (here: 12) 
 
Once all items are scored, the disclosure index is calculated for each corporation. To 
this end, the index is computed as the number of items disclosed (scoref) divided by the 
number of items expected to be disclosed (m).  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑓 = �𝑑𝑓,𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
/�𝑑𝑓,𝑖𝑚
𝑖=1
 
In other words, the disclosure index is a ratio of the actual score to the maximum score 
which a corporation is expected to achieve. Accordingly, corporations are not penalized 
for those disclosures that are not relevant to them. For example, only corporations that 
disclose a deferred tax asset or liability on the face of the balance-sheet are expected to 
19  For a review of the previous disclosure studies, see e.g. Ahmed/Courtis (1999); Hassan/Marston 
(2010). 
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report separately on deferred tax expenses or benefits on the face of the income state-
ment.  
Regression equation and hypotheses development  
Our dependent variable is the disclosure index which is, by construction, a fraction and 
therefore constrained to be between zero and one. This specific structure of the depend-
ent variable is accounted for in generalized linear model (GLM) estimators which are in 
this respect superior to OLS.20 Ordinary linear regression assumes that a constant 
change in explanatory variables results in a constant change in the dependent variable. 
This assumption, however, is no longer appropriate if the values of the dependent varia-
ble are bound between 0 and 1. Therefore we chose a generalized linear model (GLM) 
which is shown to be adequate in situations where the dependent variable follows a dis-
tribution other than normal. In particular for this case, we take a GLM with a binomial 
distribution and a logit link function (Papke/Wooldridge (1996); Papke/Wooldridge 
(2008)).21 To empirically examine the specific determinants of disclosure quality, we 
estimate the following equation:  
ff13f12f11f10
f9f8f7
f6f5f4
f32f1f
ε  industry β  ngshareholdi β listing βBIG4 β  
  cap-small β  intensityaudit  β days # β  
 leverage  β PTROA β liquidity β  
  )eln(firmSiz β ETR β nrecognitio βαindex disclosure
++++
+++
+++
++++=
(1) 
Accordingly, we model the quality of tax disclosures (disclosure index) as a function of 
variables which are expected to affect firms’ disclosure decisions. Table 5 specifies the 
explanatory variables and summarizes our expectations on their relationship with dis-
closure quality.  
First, we expect a positive link between the recognition of deferred taxes on the face of 
the balance sheet and the degree of detailed information provided in the notes to the 
financial statements. This may be seen as a rationale consequence of firms meeting the 
information requirements of investors. In this regard, Ahmed et al. (2006), for example, 
report that items recognized in financial statements are of higher relevance than those 
items that are merely disclosed in the notes. Accordingly, we expect the recognition of 
20  To ensure comparability to previous studies, we nevertheless conduct a OLS regression as a robust-
ness check in section 4.3.4.  
21  We also include the robust option to obtain robust standard errors. 
19 
 
                                                     
deferred tax assets and liabilities to be positively correlated with disclosure quality and 
capture this effect with the binary variable recognition.  
Second, when total tax expenses are equivalent to a high percentage of profit before 
taxes (effective tax rate), they become a major factor in firms’ profit after taxes. Con-
sidering the materiality principle (Gleason/Mills (2002)), firms with high effective tax 
rates are therefore expected to provide additional information on their tax position to 
rationalize high tax payments. At the same time, low effective tax rates are widely asso-
ciated with tax avoidance (Hanlon/Heitzman (2010, p. 139-141)). In line with political 
process theory (Giner Inchausti (1997, p. 54)), firms may thus be interested in disclos-
ing more information on their tax position in order to justify low effective tax rates. 
Taken these two offsetting effects into account, the extent and quality of disclosure on 
deferred taxes is assumed to be related to firms’ ratio of total tax expense to profits be-
fore taxes (ETR) to some extent, but we do not predict the direction of their relationship.  
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Table 5: BilMoG and tax disclosure: Regression variables  
Variable   Expectation 
Tax status  
Recognition  
Dummy variable capturing if a corporation recognizes deferred taxes on the face 
of the balance-sheet (1) or not (0) 
+ 
ETR Ratio of total tax to annual profits before taxes (absolute)  0 
General disclosure variables  
Firm size Total assets reported on the balance-sheet (natural logarithm)  + 
Liquidity Ratio of current assets to short-term accounts payable - 
PTROA Ratio of profits before taxes to total assets 0 
Leverage  Ratio of liabilities to total assets + 
Implementation costs 
Audit intensity Audit-related fees paid divided by revenues. + 
# days  Number of days between closing date and the date of the audit opinion - 
Small-cap  
Dummy variable capturing if the corporation is required to fulfill the disclosure 
requirements of Sec. 285 No. 29 HGB only due to its listing in an EU-regulated 
segment (1) or not (0)  
- 
Firm monitoring 
BIG4 
Dummy variable capturing if the opinion was applied by one of the largest four 
audit firms [Deloitte; Ernst & Young; KPMG; PwC] (1) or not (0) 
+ 
Listing 
Dummy variable capturing if the corporation is listed in the market segment 
Prime Standard (1) or not (0) 
+ 
Shareholding  
Dummy variable capturing if a known recorded shareholder has more than 25% 
of direct or total ownership [BvD Independence Indicator: A] in the corporation 
(1) or not (0) 
- 
Other firm characteristics  
Industry  NACE code  0 
Note: +, 0 and – denote the expected relationship between the dependent variable disclosure index and the independ-
ent variables as explained below.  
Following previous disclosure literature (e.g. Lang/Lundholm (1993)), we also include 
four explanatory variables (firm size, liquidity, profitability and leverage) that have 
been identified to be correlated with the overall disclosure quality. First, we expect a 
positive relationship between firms’ size, measured as the natural logarithm of total as-
sets, and the level of tax-related disclosures. As reviewed in a meta-study by Ah-
med/Courtis (1999, pp. 44-49), there are several reasons for this link, e.g. economies of 
scale and higher visibility, complexity and demand for external funds of larger firms. 
However, the most important point in our setting is that costs associated with the adop-
tion of new accounting and disclosure regulations are expected to be lower for large 
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firms due to their more sophisticated internal reporting systems. It is therefore more 
likely that larger corporations may not only react to changes in accounting rules more 
quickly, but also provide higher levels of disclosure in the year of adopting new ac-
counting standards (Murphy (1999)). In terms of firms’ liquidity, less liquid corpora-
tions are expected to disclose more information on deferred tax assets than others. As 
deferred tax assets represent future tax and cash-flow benefits, providing detailed in-
formation on those may support firms’ credibility to meet short-term obligations. More-
over, as deferred tax assets may only be recognized if taxable profits are timely availa-
ble to utilize the deductible temporary differences,22 reporting on deferred tax assets 
signals positive expectations on short-term future earnings. Accordingly, we expect the 
sign of the coefficient for liquidity, i.e. the ratio of current assets to short-term accounts 
payable, to be negative. By contrast, as disclosure of information is widely considered 
to be an instrument for reducing agency problems associated with costs of creditors 
(Robinson/Schmidt (2013, p. 15)), we control for firms’ indebtedness and expect a posi-
tive relation between disclosure quality and leverage, i.e. the ratio of liabilities to total 
assets. Moreover, as previous research finds mixed evidence of firms’ performance and 
disclosure quality, we include a measure of performance, i.e. the pretax return on asset 
(PTROA), but do not make predictions on the sign of the coefficient.23 
The adoption of the temporary-differences approach under Sec. 275 HGB and the new 
disclosure requirements under Sec. 285 No. 29 HGB placed significant demand on firm 
and auditor resources (e.g. Maier/Weil (2009, p. 2735) and Küting/Seel (2009, p. 924)). 
To identify the extent to which such implementation and compliance costs explain the 
observed shortcomings in disclosure quality, we consider a number of variables that are 
assumed to proxy for implementation costs and efforts in reporting. We first expect a 
greater audit effort to be positively associated with the quality of disclosure of deferred 
taxes and use audit intensity, i.e. the amount paid for audit-related services during the 
fiscal year 2010 in relation to revenues, as a proxy. Moreover, we follow Robin-
son/Schmidt (2013, p. 13) and include the reporting lag, i.e. the number of days between 
the end of the fiscal year and the date of the audit opinion (#days). Assuming that rather 
large firms have well-established tax and accounting departments and are therefore able 
to react immediately to changes in accounting regulations, we argue that #days captures 
22  For details, see Section 2.  
23  For a review of the literature on the relationship between firms’ profitability and disclosure quality, 
see Chavent et al. (2006, p. 189). 
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the burden in terms of costs and efforts posed in particular on those (assumable smaller) 
corporations, which don’t have such sophisticated systems and processes in place. Rela-
tively higher implementation costs should in particular apply for corporations which are 
generally considered to be small, but are legally obligated to fulfill the disclosure re-
quirements of large corporations due to their listing in an EU-regulated financial-market 
segment (Sec. 263 (3) 2 HGB). In this respect, we argue that, if after controlling for 
firm size, such firms are associated with lower disclosure quality, then we can assume 
that considerable implementation costs and the significant demand on firms’ accounting 
department resources partially explain the observed shortcomings in disclosure quality. 
Accordingly, we include small-cap, i.e. a binary variable capturing if the corporation is 
required to disclose information on deferred taxes only because of its listing, and as-
sume a negative relationship with disclosure quality. 
In line with previous literature which suggests that external monitoring has an effect on 
disclosure quality (e.g. Robinson/Schmidt (2013)), we also consider the impact of the 
monitoring effort of different external users of financial statements on tax disclosure 
quality. Our prediction is that external monitoring efforts increase disclosure quality. 
We first include a variable that captures the impact of the outside auditor. Consistent 
with previous research (e.g. Rice/Weber (2011, p. 13) and Ettredge et al. (2011, p. 
872)), we presume a higher disclosure quality when firms are audited by a Big4 compa-
ny (BIG4). Second, it is expected that the level of transparency requirements in different 
financial-market segments influences firms’ disclosure quality. Accordingly, we predict 
that firms included in the Prime Standard of Deutsche Börse AG24, i.e. the market seg-
ment with the highest transparency requirements in Germany, provide a higher level of 
disclosure quality than non-Prime Standard firms, i.e. we expect that listing, a binary 
variable, is positively associated with disclosure quality. Third, as agency theory sug-
gests that monitoring efforts vary with shareholder population (Fan/Wong (2002, pp. 
407-409)), we also control for ownership structure by adding shareholding to our esti-
mation equation. This binary variable captures if a single shareholder has more than 
25% of direct or total ownership in the corporation. In line with Cooke (1989, pp. 177-
178), information asymmetry is expected to be less prevalent in firms with majority 
24  Deutsche Börse structures its markets on three levels of transparency (Prime, General and Entry 
Standard). Companies in the Prime Standard are, for example, required to prepare quarterly financial 
statements and maintain a corporate action timetable. For details, see http://deutsche-boerse.com.  
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shareholders. Accordingly, we expect our measure of shareholder structure (sharehold-
ing) to be negatively associated with disclosure quality. 
As several previous studies have found a relationship between the quality of disclosures 
and the industry sector (e.g. Cooke (1992)), while others report no differences in the 
disclosure level across industries (e.g. Watson et al. (2002)), we also include industry 
fixed effects. However, in line with Chavent et al. (2006, p. 190) we assume that there 
is no link between the disclosure of tax-related information and the different industry 
sectors. 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics  
To begin with, Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for the regression variables. Of 
special interest is the disclosure index, which averages 0.4946. As mentioned above, 64 
corporations do not provide any information at all on deferred taxes and score zero, 
while 24 firms score one, i.e. they provide all mandatory and voluntary information 
which the firm is expected to disclose. Considering the mandatory disclosure index as 
used in one of the robustness tests discussed below, firms in our sample disclose, on 
average, 3.39 of the 5 mandatory disclosure items (67.94%). Overall, 149 corporations 
provide all information required by German GAAP.  
As already shown in Figure 1, a total of 119 (25.59%) corporations in the sample recog-
nize deferred tax assets and liabilities on the face of the balance-sheet. With respect to 
the ratio of total tax expenses to profit before taxes, corporations in our sample report, 
on average, an effective tax rate of 21.44%.25  
Table 6 illustrates the heterogeneity in firm size and other explanatory variables across 
the sample. 
25  Following Gupta/Newberry (1997, pp. 12-13) and Schmidt (2006, p. 598), the ETR is set to “1” when 
the ETR is greater than 100% and to “0” when the ETR is negative. Accordingly, the ratio of total 
taxes to profit before taxes ranges from zero, i.e. corporations report either negative or zero tax pay-
ments, to 100%.  
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Table 6: BilMoG and tax disclosure: Descriptive statistics  
Variable  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
Min Max 
Dependent variable: disclosure index 
Aggregate  0.4946 0.2901 0 1 
Mandatory 0.6794 0.3359 0 1 
Tax status 
Recognition  0.2559 0.4368 0 1 
ETR  0.2144 0.3048 0 1 
General disclosure variables 
Firm size (Total assets)  1,879,154,000 7,737,443,000 690,892 59,950,000,000 
Liquidity 19.8956 80.6478 0,05233 705.8519 
PTROA 0.02703 0.1711 -0.9805 0.4478 
Leverage 0.3128 0.2275 0.0009 0.8951 
Implementation costs 
Audit intensity 0.0763 0.2632 0.000012 2.1098 
# days  80.4645 30.2094 27 217 
Small-cap 0.2624 0.4403 0 1 
Firm monitoring 
BIG4 0.6000 0.4904 0 1 
Listing 0.5333 0.4994 0 1 
Shareholding  0.6688 0.4711 0 1 
Note: All continuous explanatory variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentile.  
Finally, the correlations26 among the twelve explanatory variables don’t give any indi-
cation for an unacceptable level of multicollinearity in the data.27  
4.3.3 Empirical results  
Based on Equation (1), columns (1) - (3) of Table 7 present our main results for the fi-
nal sample. Consistent with our expectations, we find a strong association between the 
recognition of deferred taxes and disclosure quality in Specification (1), but no signifi-
cant relationship with firms’ effective tax rate. The estimated coefficient of recognition 
is positive, indicating that the recognition of deferred taxes in the balance sheet yields 
enhanced disclosure quality in the notes to the financial statement. As already pointed 
out in the descriptive analysis, we accordingly argue that the abolishment of the recog-
26  See correlation matrix in the Annex (Table 8). 
27  According to Farrar/Glauber (1967) harmful levels of multicollinearity are not present until bivariate 
correlations exceed 0.8. 
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nition option for net deferred tax assets under Sec. 274 HGB might not only avoid man-
agers’ discretion in accounting for deferred taxes, but also induce firms to disclose more 
precise information on deferred taxes and future tax consequences in the notes. Not sur-
prisingly, we also find a significant and positive association between disclosure quality 
and firms’ size. The results here, while generally consistent with the empirical disclo-
sure literature, suggest higher knowledge and more efficient interactions between larger 
firms’ accounting and tax department at the root of the relationship we observe. In line 
with our expectations, the significant negative coefficient of liquidity suggests that less 
liquid corporations tend to provide more detailed information on deferred taxes than 
others. By contrast, we cannot provide evidence for firms’ profitability and leverage to 
be determinants of tax-related disclosure quality in all six model specifications. Similar-
ly, we find no differences in disclosure level between industries.  
After adding the measures of implementation costs in Specification (2), the results re-
ported above remain largely unchanged. We cannot report significant results for audit 
intensity, i.e. the ratio of audit fees divided by revenues and #days. We do find, howev-
er, a significant and negative relation between disclosure quality and small-cap. While 
this finding may indicate that high implementation and compliance costs explain the 
observed heterogeneity in tax-related disclosure policy, this is also consistent with the 
positive relationship between the level of disclosure and firms’ size. That is, firms for 
which compliance and implementation costs are expected to be relatively low provide 
higher-quality tax disclosure as measured by our disclosure index. Put differently, high 
implementation costs make compliance with recently implemented accounting stand-
ards and high-quality disclosures less likely. While this holds particularly true for 
smaller firms, large corporations are expected to benefit from their specialized 
knowledge in tax and financial accounting and thus may react faster on changes in ac-
counting and provide comprehensive disclosures in the year of adoption. 
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 Table 7: Regression results (GLM) 
Disclosure index Main regressions Robustness test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Tax status        
Recognition  1.213*** 1.176*** 1.174*** 1.310***  0.882*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.122)  (0.149) 
ETR -0.0619 -0.0853 -0.0757 -0.104 -0.0982 -0.232 
 (0.185) (0.182) (0.182) (0.192) (0.230) (0.242) 
General disclosure variables      
Firm size 0.128*** 0.0778*** 0.0956*** 0.0920** 0.0868** 0.174*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0341) (0.0358) (0.0398) (0.0483) 
Liquidity -0.00113** -0.00116** -0.00120** -0.000982 -0.00131* -0.00171** 
 (0.000503) (0.000549) (0.000563) (0.000651) (0.000784) (0.000689) 
PTROA 0.0870 -0.146 -0.209 -0.316 -0.136 0.223 
 (0.462) (0.473) (0.476) (0.490) (0.574) (0.538) 
Leverage 0.251 0.273 0.238 0.126 0.195 0.397 
 (0.271) (0.270) (0.273) (0.289) (0.330) (0.354) 
Implementation costs       
Audit intensity  -0.0645 -0.0808 -0.181 -0.173 -0.131 
  (0.176) (0.180) (0.216) (0.242) (0.281) 
# days   -0.00344 -0.00379 -0.00490* -0.00457 -0.00290 
  (0.00236) (0.00239) (0.00267) (0.00291) (0.00332) 
Small-cap  -0.258* -0.262* -0.366** -0.354** -0.534*** 
  (0.139) (0.139) (0.151) (0.172) (0.169) 
Firm monitoring        
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 BIG4   -0.130 -0.205 -0.145 0.0352 
   (0.125) (0.138) (0.156) (0.165) 
Listing   -0.0410 -0.0336 0.00857 -0.118 
   (0.126) (0.134) (0.157) (0.167) 
Shareholding    0.0424 0.0668 0.0835 -0.0108 
   (0.114) (0.121) (0.136) (0.158) 
Observations 463 452 452 403 336 452 
Note: In specification (4) all observation showing net deferred tax liabilities are omitted. In Specification (5) we exclude all corporations which disclose deferred tax assets and/or liabilities on the 
face of the balance sheet. In Specification (6) only mandatory disclosure items are taken into account. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01. 
Please also note that this table only contains the regression coefficients; for marginal effects see Table 9 in the Annex.
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 In order to determine whether disclosure quality may also be driven by the information 
requirements of external users of financial statements, we add three variables which 
approximate for external monitoring efforts in Specification (3). The signs and signifi-
cance levels of the variables discussed above remain largely unchanged when the new 
variables are included. At the same time, we find no significant relationship between 
disclosure quality and external monitoring efforts. Although this result seems surprising 
at first glance, it is consistent with the findings of the comprehensive meta-study by 
Ahmed/Courtis (1999) reviewing the results of 29 studies on the association between 
corporate characteristics and disclosure quality. While reporting that the degree of com-
pliance with mandatory disclosure requirements is significantly higher for corporations 
which are audited by larger audit firms, they find that a significant relationship cannot 
be identified if disclosure quality is, similar to our approach, assessed by an aggregate 
disclosure index. Therefore, taking these results into account, we disaggregate the dis-
closure index and re-run our estimations in Specification (6). Moreover, Ahmed/Courtis 
(1999) cannot provide evidence on a significant relationship between firms’ listing and 
different empirical measures of disclosure quality.  
4.3.4 Robustness checks  
In order to investigate the robustness of the primary regression results, we run three 
additional model specifications. First of all, as accounting requirements are different 
and disclosure incentives may diverge, all observations reporting net deferred tax liabili-
ties are omitted in Specification (4) in order to avoid potential bias induced by the man-
datory recognition. Accordingly, the remaining 414 firms in the subsample are exclu-
sively faced with the decision to recognize net deferred tax assets. In line with our ex-
pectation, that it is not only the existence of temporary taxable differences, but also oth-
er motivations and incentives that underlay the heterogeneity in tax-related disclosure 
quality, the results are largely consistent with the previous findings in Specifications (1) 
- (3). That is, the coefficients on recognition and firm size as well as two measures of 
implementation and compliance costs (i.e. small-cap and additionally #days) are signif-
icant, while all external monitoring variables remain insignificant.  
In Specification (5), we exclude those firms that recognize deferred tax assets and liabil-
ities in their balance sheets in order to validate that our results also hold true for non-
recognizing firms. Furthermore we want to ensure that our results are not driven by a 
potential correlation between the recognition variable and the dependent variable, i.e. 
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 the disclosure index. Again, we find significant effects for the same variables as in 
Specifications (1)- (3).  
Moreover, as illustrated, compliance with mandatory disclosure regulations varies great-
ly across firms. Ahmed/Courtis (1999) provide evidence that the extent to which firms’ 
disclosure policy is reflected in firm characteristics is highly dependent on the type of 
disclosure index considered. Accordingly, we re-examine our measure of disclosure 
quality and in Specification (6) we only take mandatory disclosure items into account. 
Consistent with the previous findings, the results suggest that the level of mandatory 
disclosure is correlated with firms’ recognition of deferred taxes, size and liquidity as 
well as with small cap. Contradicting the findings of most previous studies, all variables 
of external firm monitoring remain, however, insignificant. Accordingly, we cannot 
provide evidence for our expectation that external monitoring efforts have a positive 
association with the extent of tax-related disclosure in firms’ individual financial state-
ments. 
4.3.5 Alternative model specification 
To ensure comparability with previous literature on disclosure quality,28 we also esti-
mate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and run the same specifications (1)-(6) 
(see Table 10 in the Annex).29 The signs and significance levels of the coefficients as 
well as the marginal effects are strongly in line with our GLM results and therefore sup-
port our findings.  
Finally as an alternative model specification, we estimate a two-boundary Tobit model 
to account for corner solutions (Wooldridge (2010, pp. 667)).30 Our results (see Table 
11 in the Annex) again remain largely unchanged. However, in addition to the above 
findings, we also observe a consistent significant negative relation between disclosure 
quality and #days (in all specifications apart from Specification (6)). This further sup-
ports our position that implementation and compliance costs may negatively influence 
firms’ reporting quality.  
 
28  For an overview, see Chavent et al. (2006), pp. 207-214. 
29  Nevertheless, we do not use OLS as our main specification since our dependent variable is bound to 
be between zero and one and thus we can’t assume a linear relationship, in particular beyond these 
boundaries. 
30  We do not use this approach as main model because of heteroscedasticity issues. Nevertheless, the 
results remain largely unchanged, given the assumptions of the Tobit model.  
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 4.3.6. Further analysis: Decomposition of the reporting items of the disclosure index  
Additionally, we aim to assess whether there are differences in the determinants of the 
disclosure quality across the single items. Therefore we run regression specification (3) 
with the full set of control variables for each item separately.31 As the dependent varia-
ble is binary in this case, we use a probit model (Table 12).  
First of all, the results unfold that the determinants of the aggregate score correspond to 
the main drivers of most of the single mandatory reporting items (item 1-3), e.g. recog-
nition and firm_size increase the probability of reporting on those components. Howev-
er, item 4 (reporting on tax loss carryforwards) reveals different incentives to some ex-
tent: First of all, a higher ETR seems to decrease the probability to report on losses with 
respect to deferred taxes. In addition, firms with high leverage are more likely to dis-
close on this item. These findings may indicate that low ETR and highly leveraged 
companies are more willing to provide information on this component. For companies 
actually reporting that they have taken tax loss carryforwards into consideration when 
reporting on deferred tax assets, this result could be interpreted as a signaling of positive 
future economic prospects. Importantly, firm_size, however, does not impact on this 
disclosure decision.  
Regarding the voluntary disclosure items, it first of all stands out that firm_size again 
does not seem to be relevant. In support of our previous argumentation on the positive 
signaling effect of the reporting on losses, we do find that less profitable companies are 
more probable to provide additional quantitative information on tax loss carryforwards 
(items 8 and 9). Interestingly, we also find that companies which are audited by a Big 4 
company are less likely to report on the voluntary disclosure items (items 7-9).    
  
31  We do not, however, consider items 11 and 12 as all concerned corporations disclose these compo-
nents, i.e. there is no variation.  
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 5 Conclusion 
Building on a unique sample of 465 hand-collected individual financial statements, we 
find that current accounting standards governing the recognition and disclosure of in-
come taxes are complex, but limited in information which allow for precise inferences 
of book-tax differences and taxable income across firms.  
At the same time, it is important to note that the newly implemented disclosure re-
quirements under Sec. 285 No. 29 HGB provide a starting point for studying the inter-
play between financial and tax accounting and various other aspects of corporate taxa-
tion. We take advantage of the recently adopted disclosure regulations and disaggregate 
deferred tax assets and liabilities in their components to shed light on the sources and 
magnitude of the reporting gap in Germany. The descriptive statistics reveal that Ger-
many is far away from a one-book accounting system. In particular, differences in the 
recognition and measurement of provisions (mostly mandatory) as well as unused tax 
loss-carryforwards can be substantial in terms of their potential effect on future profits. 
This becomes more remarkable when the great deal of managers’ discretion in reporting 
on deferred taxes is taken into consideration. To this end, such discretion not only cre-
ates information asymmetry between the management and external users of financial 
statements, but also contradicts the main intention of the BilMoG-Act to increase the 
information content and transparency of financial statements prepared under German 
GAAP. We therefore recommend to abolish the recognition option for deferred tax as-
sets and to state the disclosure regulations on deferred taxes in the notes more precisely. 
Given the substantial heterogeneity in reporting on deferred taxes, multivariate analyses 
were conducted to examine why some firms disclose detailed information on deferred 
taxes and future tax consequences, while others do not even comply with the minimum 
disclosure requirements of Sec. 285 No. 29 HGB. To address this question, we construct 
a disclosure index measuring the extent to which mandatory and voluntary items are 
disclosed and undertake a detailed analysis of firms’ tax disclosure practice in the notes 
to the financial statements. In short, three key findings stand out from the analysis: First, 
the recognition of deferred tax assets and liabilities on the face of the balance-sheet is 
significantly and positively related with disclosure quality. Accordingly, this supports 
our recommendation to abandon the recognition option for deferred tax assets under 
Sec. 274 HGB aiming not only at reducing managers’ discretion in accounting, but also 
at enhancing firms’ disclosure quality in reporting on deferred taxes. Second, our results 
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 show that larger firms tend to provide more detailed information on deferred taxes and 
future taxable consequences than smaller firms. This is consistent with the more general 
disclosure literature and the assumption that larger firms’ accounting and tax depart-
ments tend to have specific knowledge and effective communication in place. Third, the 
results suggest that, all else equal, high compliance and implementation costs might also 
explain the observed shortcomings in disclosure quality. Moreover, we find that differ-
ent reporting incentives might apply if reporting on losses is assessed in isolation. To 
sum up, the results of this study not only have important implications for the under-
standing of the magnitude and sources of the reporting gap, but also for the discussion 
about whether and how to reform disclosure requirements under German GAAP.   
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 Recognition ETR Firm Size Liquidity Profitability Leverage Audit-ratio # days Small-cap Big4 Prime Share-
holding 
Recognition  1.0000            
ETR 0.1057 1.0000           
Firm Size 0.0593 0.0486 1.0000          
Liquidity -0.0130 0.0189 0.0544 1.0000         
Profitability 0.0732 -0.1593 0.1906 0.0389 1.0000        
Leverage 0.0370 0.0270 0.3187 -0.1705 -0.1824 1.0000       
Audit-ratio -0.0137 -0.0504 -0.0670 0.1691 -0.1229 -0.1640 1.0000      
# days -0.0494 0.0472 -0.3969 -0.0663 -0.4287 0.0509 0.1423 1.0000     
Small-cap -0.0551 -0.0923 -0.3615 -0.0235 -0.0147 -0.1814 0.0425 0.1020 1.0000    
Big4 0.0111 0.1079 0.4154 -0.0051 0.0162 0.0915 -0.1216 -0.2093 -0.1865 1.0000   
Prime 0.0311 0.0209 0.4478 -0.0264 0.0500 0.0189 0.0585 -0.3169 -0.1214 0.2207 1.0000  
Share-
holding 
0.0303 0.0512 -0.1303 -0.0154 0.0320 0.0068 -0.0460 0.0721 0.0159 -0.0295 -0.2362 1.0000 
 Table 9: Marginal effects (GLM) 
Disclosure index Main regressions Robustness test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Tax status        
Recognition  0.282 0.269 0.268 0.300  0.170 
 (0.0227) (0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0251)  (0.0288) 
ETR -0.0141 -0.0195 -0.0173 -0.0238 -0.0232 -0.0449 
 (0.0421) (0.0416) (0.0414) (0.0440) (0.0541) (0.0466) 
General disclosure variables      
Firm size 0.0290 0.0178 0.0218 0.0211 0.0205 0.0337 
 (0.0057) (0.0067) (0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0093) (0.0091) 
Liquidity -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
PTROA 0.0198 -0.0334 -0.0478 -0.0725 -0.0322 -0.0431 
 (0.1050) (0.1082) (0.1086) (0.1122) (0.1354) (0.1038) 
Leverage 0.0570 0.0623 0.0544 0.0288 0.0460 0.0767 
 (0.0616) (0.0617) (0.0624) (0.0663) (0.0778) (0.0683) 
Implementation costs       
Audit intensity  -0.0147 -0.0185 -0.0413 -0.0409 -0.0253 
  (0.0402) (0.0410) (0.0494) (0.0571) (0.0541) 
# days   -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0006 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Small-cap  -0.0590 -0.0598 -0.0839 -0.0835 -0.1032 
  (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0342) (0.0401) (0.0319) 
Firm monitoring        
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 BIG4   -0.0297 -0.0469 -0.0342 0.0068 
   (0.0285) (0.0314) (0.0369) (0.0318) 
Listing   -0.0094 -0.0077 0.0020 -0.0228 
   (0.0287) (0.0306) (0.0370) (0.0322) 
Shareholding    0.0097 0.0153 0.0197 -0.0021 
   (0.0260) (0.0276) (0.0320) (0.0306) 
Observations 463 452 452 403 336 452 
Note: In specification (4) all observation showing net deferred tax liabilities are omitted. In Specification (5) we exclude all corporations which disclose deferred taxes on the face of 
the balance sheet. In Specification (6) only mandatory disclosure items are taken into account. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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 Table 10: Regression results (OLS) 
Disclosure index Main regressions Robustness test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Tax status        
Recognition  0.283*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.299***  0.163*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0234) (0.0256)  (0.0263) 
ETR -0.0132 -0.0185 -0.0163 -0.0217 -0.0230 -0.0385 
 (0.0425) (0.0423) (0.0424) (0.0449) (0.0550) (0.0503) 
General disclosure variables      
Firm size 0.0297*** 0.0184*** 0.0225*** 0.0216** 0.0212** 0.0324*** 
 (0.00582) (0.00683) (0.00795) (0.00836) (0.00961) (0.00919) 
Liquidity -0.00026** -0.00016** -0.00027** -0.00023 -0.00029* -0.00036** 
 (0.00108) (0.000117) (0.000121) (0.000140) (0.000155) (0.000157) 
PTROA 0.0198 -0.0321 -0.0470 -0.0723 -0.0352 0.0730 
 (0.101) (0.110) (0.110) (0.114) (0.132) (0.123) 
Leverage 0.0582 0.0647 0.0560 0.0303 0.0480 0.0781 
 (0.0627) (0.0631) (0.0639) (0.0678) (0.0787) (0.0737) 
Implementation costs       
Audit intensity  -0.0140 -0.0177 -0.0403 -0.0389 -0.0276 
  (0.0396) (0.0406) (0.0483) (0.0532) (0.0643) 
# days   -0.000787 -0.000865 -0.00111* -0.00105 -0.000523 
  (0.000547) (0.000554) (0.000614) (0.000674) (0.000704) 
Small-cap  -0.0591* -0.0599* -0.0836** -0.0824** -0.116*** 
  (0.0323) (0.0324) (0.0349) (0.0402) (0.0385) 
Firm monitoring        
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 BIG4   -0.0301 -0.0468 -0.0346 0.00715 
   (0.0291) (0.0322) (0.0379) (0.0345) 
Listing   -0.00968 -0.00789 -0.00143 -0.0195 
   (0.0293) (0.0322) (0.0378) (0.0399) 
Shareholding    0.00962 0.0150 0.0199 -0.00183 
   (0.0266) (0.0283) (0.0326) (0.0320) 
R² 0.2677 0.2635 0.2660 0.2506 0.1128 0.1967 
Observations 463 452 452 403 336 452 
Note: In specification (4) all observation showing net deferred tax liabilities are omitted. In Specification (5) we exclude all corporations which disclose deferred taxes on the face of 
the balance sheet. In Specification (6) only mandatory disclosure items are taken into account. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. 
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 Table 11: Regression results (Tobit model) 
Disclosure index Main regressions Robustness test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Tax status        
Recognition  0.318*** 0.305*** 0.304*** 0.333***  0.219*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0410)  (0.0574) 
ETR -0.0270 -0.0344 -0.0324 -0.0381 -0.0447 -0.0820 
 (0.0480) (0.0474) (0.0475) (0.0511) (0.0634) (0.0845) 
General disclosure variables      
Firm size 0.0378*** 0.0223** 0.0256*** 0.0247** 0.0235* 0.0565*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0084) (0.0096) (0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0173) 
Liquidity -0.0003* -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0003* -0.0004* -0.0006** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
PTROA 0.0272 -0.0386 -0.0504 -0.0821 -0.0150 -0.0700 
 (0.0934) (0.0979) (0.0992) (0.105) (0.128) (0.175) 
Leverage 0.0693 0.0773 0.0706 0.0454 0.0757 0.134 
 (0.0714) (0.0716) (0.0723) (0.0774) (0.0924) (0.128) 
Implementation costs       
Audit intensity  -0.0059 -0.092 -0.0291 -0.0297 0.002 
  (0.0563) (0.0568) (0.0638) (0.0732) (0.0101) 
# days   -0.0009* -0.001* -0.00014** -0.00013* -0.0011 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Small-cap  -0.0824** -0.0831** -0.113*** -0.121*** -0.173*** 
  (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0379) (0.0452) (0.0609) 
Firm monitoring        
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 BIG4   -0.0243 -0.0451 -0.0295 -0.0115 
   (0.0322) (0.0357) (0.0428) (0.0568) 
Listing   -0.0079 -0.0043 0.0105 -0.0322 
   (0.0335) (0.0363) (0.0442) (0.0595) 
Shareholding    0.0057 0.0152 0.0241 -0.0331 
   (0.0308) (0.0333) (0.0395) (0.0051) 
Observations 463 452 452 403 336 452 
Note: In specification (4) all observation showing net deferred tax liabilities are omitted. In Specification (5) we exclude all corporations which disclose deferred taxes on the face of 
the balance sheet. In Specification (6) only mandatory disclosure items are taken into account. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. 
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 Table 12: Regression results: Single items of disclosure index (Probit model) 
Disclosure item (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tax status            
Recognition  1.594*** 1.363*** 1.160*** 0.833***  2.770*** 0.182*** 1.223*** 0.625*** -0.413 
 (0.435) (0.235) (0.203) (0.153)  (0.420) (0.147) (0.147) (0.172) (0.272) 
ETR -0.407 -0.064 0.102 -0.453** 0.191 0.007 0.086 -0.180 -0.098 0.690 
 (0.262) (0.241) (0.233) (0.208) (0.440) (0.272) (0.225) (0.220) (0.268) (0.426) 
General disclosure variables 
Size 0.214*** 0.188*** 0.136*** 0.035 -0.039 0.011 0.002 0.012 0.057 0.051 
 (0.065) (0.049) (0.047) (0.042) (0.103) (0.051) (0.046) (0.045) (0.054) (0.112) 
Liquidity -0.002* -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
PTROA 0.503 0.074 0.443 -0.627 0.784 -0.342 -0.514 -0.733* -1.207** -1.433 
 (0.513) (0.431) (0.451) (0.452) (0.901) (0.508) (0.441) (0.434) (0.480) (0.913) 
Leverage 0.586 0.176 -0.096 0.822** -1.216* 0.199 0.006 0.467 0.468 -1.125 
 (0.258) (0.354) (0.329) (0.326) (0.728) (0.398) (0.345) (0.327) (0.392) (0.712) 
Implementation costs 
Audit intensity 0.258 -0.509* -0.213 -0.032 0.748 0.160 -0.032 -0.088 -0.171 -0.403 
 (0.404) (0.286) (0.277) (0.228) (0.682) (0.306) (0.227) (0.242) (0.239) (0.481) 
# days  -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005* -0.006* -0.009 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Small-cap 0.599*** -0.503*** -0.545*** 0.016 -0.054 0.085 -0.143 0.062 0.147 -0.079 
 (0.184) (0.163) (0.158) (0.153) (0.340) (0.198) (0.166) (0.167) (0.193) (0.351) 
Firm monitoring 
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 BIG4 0.219 -0.152 0.204 -0.159 0.176 -0.169 -0.283* -0.308** -0.413** -0.718** 
 (0.185) (0.163) (0.152) (0.145) (0.291) (0.184) (0.155) (0.150) (0.189) (0.313) 
Listing -0.235 -0.071 -0.007 -0.105 -0.107 0.023 -0.077 -0.044 0.057 -0.111 
 (0.213) (0.168) (0.158) (0.151) (0.290) (0.290) (0.162) (0.157) (0.195) (0.344) 
Shareholding  0.171 0.011 0.187 -0.161 -0.335 0.108 0.133 0.043 0.086 -0.206 
 (0.186) (0.154) (0.150) (0.137) (0.288) (0.169) (0.152) (0.147) (0.183) (0.306) 
Observations 426 451 449 452 113 362 452 449 410 110 
Note: Dependent variables are as follows: (1) Disclosure of deferred taxes on the face of the balance sheet and corresponding explanations in the notes or that the corporations does not 
recognize net deferred tax assets; (2) Disclosure of tax rates at which deferred taxes have been measured; (3) Disclosure of temporary differences on which (un)recognized deferred 
taxes are based on (qualitative); (4) Disclosure that tax loss carryforwards have been taken into consideration when reporting on deferred taxes (qualitative); (5) Disclosure of tax ex-
penses or benefits on the face of the income statements; (6) Disclosure of aggregate deferred tax assets (quantitative); (7) Disclosure of temporary differences on which (un)recognized 
deferred taxes are based (quantitative); (8) Disclosure of recoverable loss carryforwards (quantitative); (9) Disclosure of non-recoverable loss carryforwards (quantitative); (10) Disclo-
sure of the different types of taxes that the loss carryforward is based on (quantitative). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01.  
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